In the wake of the Tinker decision of 1969, a new legal view of people under 18 began to emerge. The 1st Amendment rights of students—"freedoms of expression"—were guaranteed by the Tinker decision, as long as there was no threat of "substantial disruption" of the school program. Then, in Goss v. Lopez, 1975, the Court found that public schools had to provide some adult due process rights to juveniles facing severe disciplinary action in school. Under the law, the doctrine of in loco parentis gave way to a new conception of "student citizen."
However, what were the limits of the Tinker rule? What procedures were fair to students and, at the same time, conducive to good discipline and order in the schools? What kind of balance could be struck between the "compelling and overriding need of the state" to establish and enforce order, and the "right" of students to express themselves? The question was tested 17 years after Tinker by the case Bethel v. Fraser, 1986.
On April 26, 1983, 17-year-old Matthew Fraser, a senior at Bethel High School in Bethel, Washington, spoke to a school assembly to nominate a classmate for vice president of the student government. Students were required either to attend the assembly or go to study hall. Prior to the assembly, Matthew consulted three teachers about a short speech he proposed to present. Two of the faculty said outright that he should not deliver the speech because it was "inappropriate." The text of the speech was filled with sexual references and innuendoes, although it contained no obscenities or vulgarities. On the day of the assembly, Fraser delivered the speech with enthusiasm and emphasis, and the "faculty and student body were stunned." The speech was greeted by his classmates with hoots, cheers, and lewd motions. Kuhlman, the candidate nominated by Matt Fraser, was elected by a wide margin.
On the day after the speech, Fraser was called to the office and told that he "had violated the school's disruptive conduct rule which prohibits 'conduct which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process…including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.'" At that first hearing Fraser admitted that he had used sexual innuendoes in his speech.
Fraser was suspended from school for three days, and "removed from the list of students who were eligible to make graduation remarks…" because school authorities "no longer had confidence in his judgement…." He ranked second in his graduating class at the time. His parents appealed the school district's disciplinary action. The Washington Supreme Court upheld Fraser's right to free speech. The school district then appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court was asked to examine the 1st Amendment rights of students. Was Fraser within his rights to make the speech? What limits on speech are school districts permitted to make, given their role in the educational and civic development of students? Are students guaranteed the same rights as adults? Is it more offensive to hear something spoken out loud than to read it in a book?
For the School District: Matthew Fraser's behavior was disruptive to the educational process. He made a mockery out of an exercise in citizenship, shocked the school community, and exceeded the bounds of good taste appropriate for a school setting. The use of sexual innuendo was particularly antagonistic to the educational process. Fraser was in a public high school and at a school-sponsored activity. He was under the authority of the school, not standing on a street corner. Schools must have the authority to guide young people into healthy and acceptable social forms of expression. Speech is limited even for adults, and no one can claim that high school students are adults. Therefore, schools must be provided with the means to discipline children who use offensive language. Fraser was not punished for the political nature of his speech, but rather for its sexual innuendo and obscenity.
For Matthew Fraser: The 1st Amendment protections of citizens were especially designed for situations in which political speeches are made. The 1st Amendment guarantees freedom of speech. The Court, in Tinker v. Des Moines, 1969, made clear that "students do not abandon their Constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate." Common speech forms are changing, and school authorities are often a generation or two behind these changes. The speech was not offensive to the great majority of students, nor would it turn anyone's head if heard in a public forum.
The Court voted 7–2 to uphold the judgment of the school officials. The school's rules and the disciplinary action against Matthew Fraser were deemed appropriate for a public school. Fraser's freedom of speech did not extend to being permitted to make a lewd and suggestive speech in school.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Burger pointed to "a vast difference between the political 'message' of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of Matthew Fraser's speech…. [T]he purpose of public education in America is to teach fundamental values." Burger added, "These fundamental values must include tolerance of different or unpopular political and religious views. They must also include consideration of the personal sensibilities of other students."
Distinguishing between what the 1st Amendment guarantees to adults and to minors, Burger wrote that "the use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited when an adult speaker uses it to make a political point…[but] the same latitude of expression is not permitted to children in a public school…." As Burger reasoned, "The schools, as instruments of the State, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that indulged in by this confused boy…. The discipline rule regarding obscene language gave Fraser adequate warning that his lewd speech would be punished…."
This decision narrowed the Tinker rule and clarified the right of schools to place limits on lewd, obscene, or offensive speech. When coupled with New Jersey v. T.L.O., 1985, and Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 1988, the Court provided a re-examination of the status of the juvenile, and redefined the limits of juvenile civil rights.