Beginning with the Weeks decision in 1914, the Supreme Court began to recognize a more stringent standard of due process, ruling in that case that improper behavior by the police could "taint" evidence, rendering it inadmissible in federal court. This exclusionary rule, unacknowledged in State courts for many years, was finally extended to the States by the Warren Court's Mapp decision of 1961. The Warren Court also set stringent guidelines for the examination of suspects in custody in the Escobedo and Miranda cases (1964 and 1966, respectively). In both cases, the Court threw out convictions based in part on self-incriminating statements made by the defendants—again applying the exclusionary rule and prohibiting the admission of ill-gotten evidence. In light of those decisions, police generally refrained from taking statements from suspects in custody until they had been advised of their rights and had an attorney present.
In its 1983–1984 session, however, the Burger Court considered several exceptions to the exclusionary rule. In Sheppard, 1966, and Leon, 1984, the Court affirmed the precedent of the "good faith" exception in relation to police procedures. In the case at hand, Nix v. Williams, the Court considered the constitutionality of another type of exception to the exclusionary rule.
Chief Justice Burger, in the 16th year of an 18-year tenure, presided over the case. Senior Justices William Brennan and Byron White sat at his right and left, flanked by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor.
On December 24, 1968, a 10-year-old girl disappeared from the YMCA in Des Moines, Iowa. A witness reported having seen Robert Anthony Williams leaving the building carrying a "big bundle." Two days later, Williams was arrested in a town 70 miles away. Des Moines police were sent there to take him into custody, having been told by both the defense attorney and district attorney not to "conduct any interrogation."
Emotionally affected by sadness over a crime committed so close to Christmas, the officer said to Williams as they drove that "the child's parents should be entitled to a Christian burial" for their little girl. At that point Williams agreed to tell the police officer where to find the body—in effect confessing to intimate knowledge of the crime. At the time that Williams identified the spot, a large search party was two-and-one-half miles away, combing both sides of the highway. Williams was tried and convicted of murder.
At issue were the 5th Amendment protection of the accused against self-incrimination and the 6th Amendment right to counsel. Recall that in the Miranda case, the court struck down the conviction of a confessed kidnapper. He had confessed to the crime without having been informed of his constitutional right to remain silent, and without having been provided with an attorney. In this case, and without benefit of counsel, Williams led the officers to the body. Did this act violate his right to counsel? If so, could this evidence be used, or should it be "excluded" based on the Mapp and Miranda precedents?
For Nix (State of Iowa): The Iowa police officer did not trick Williams. The suspect's own remorse led him to a confession. The protections of the Miranda rule were not intended to provide a refuge for anyone who, having confessed voluntarily, then cries "coercion." In any case, had the incident occurred an hour or two later, the search parties in the vicinity would have found the evidence and the question of a confession would be moot. Therefore, the evidence should not be excluded for it would "ultimately and inevitably" have been found in an hour or two.
For Williams: In the appeal process, Williams's attorneys asked that the body and details of the crime be ruled inadmissible under the "exclusionary rule." The information was gained by questioning a suspect without counsel present. The confession, in short, had been illegally gained. The Miranda and Mapp rules prevent the admission of evidence gained through an illegal confession.
Justice Burger wrote and delivered the opinion of the 7–2 majority that upheld Williams's prosecution and conviction based on the evidence found as a result of the confession. Williams was deprived of legal counsel, and his confession would have been disallowed under a strict application of the Miranda rule. However, Burger added, the majority of the Court agreed that the physical evidence used to convict Williams—the dead body of the child—would have been found whether he had confessed or not. With that opinion, the Court created what is known as the "inevitable discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule.
As Burger formulated the new exception, "Evidence otherwise excluded may be admissible if it would have been ultimately or inevitably…discovered by lawful means…." As for this case, he said that "Evidence of the location and condition of the girl's body was properly used by the prosecution," because search teams were two-and-one-half miles from the child's body when Williams confessed.
Like the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, the "inevitable discovery" exception was seen as a triumph by some and a travesty by others. Generally, law enforcement officials and prosecutors see the ruling as reasonable, while staunch advocates of civil rights and civil liberties see the exception as a serious erosion of the Mapp and Miranda protections of 4th, 5th, and 6th Amendment rights.